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ABSTRACT 
Marketing cooperatives in developing and transition countries face challenges when they aim to strengthen their 
competitiveness. One of these challenges relates to improving the quality of the products delivered by their members. 
Another challenge relates to the financial sustainability of the cooperative, as cooperatives have to choose between paying 
out a surplus to members and retaining it in the organisation. As these problems are not specific to one organisation, and 
public policies often affect the scope for individual cooperatives, we explore how the institutional environment helps in 
reducing those challenges. We present a case study of the Moroccan dairy industry, exploring how the institutional 
environment has affected the development and performance of dairy cooperatives. The methods used were in-depth semi-
structured interviews within six dairy cooperatives. Findings point to the weak coordination between the main value chain 
actors. We also found a lack of financial instruments to facilitate investments in adequate quality assurance equipment and 
capacity development programs. Finally, we found a perceived lack of support from state policies vis-as-vis smallholders 
and their cooperatives. 
Keywords: Institutional environment; dairy cooperatives; policy dialogue platforms; organizational challenges; collective 
marketing capacity 
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1 Introduction 
Milk production is an important economic activity of millions of small farmers and landless labourers. As a 
highly perishable product, milk requires special and timely care. Collective action, in the form of 
agricultural cooperatives (ACs) and other types of producer organizations (POs) is often used to link 
smallholder farmers to processing plants (Best et al., 2005; Dorward et al., 1998; Uotila and Dhanapala, 
1994). Dairy cooperatives and dairy POs are operating in a broader economic and institutional 
environment. To perform well, ACs and POs require an external environment that supports their 
operations and strategies as well as facilitates the effectiveness of their internal governance. In reality, 
however, ACs and POs are often facing internal organizat ional challenges, while the external environment 
does not provide much help in solving these challenges. Two typical organizational challenges are often 
present in ACs and POs, one relating to the quality of the product delivered by the members and the oth er 
relating to the financial health of the organisation. These challenges have serious implications for the 
performance of ACs and POs. 
An enabling institutional environment consists for example of transparent and sound regulatory and legal 
frameworks (World Bank, 2012), enabling policies (Agarwal, 2001; Penrose-Buckley, 2007; Markelova and 
Mwangi, 2010), a climate conducive to investment through incentives and other support services 
(Gijselinck and Bussels, 2012), and spaces for policy dialogue, allowing social capital development 
(Coleman, 1988). In order to make markets function for the poor, well -designed institutions are key 
requirements (Dorward et al., 2003; Bienabe and Sautier, 2005). Institutions are understood as the “rules 
of the game” (North, 1990), such as formal rules, informal incentives and constraints (conventions, norms 
of behaviour, and self-imposed codes of conduct).  
This paper explores the demands that dairy marketing cooperatives in Morocco have towards the 
institutional environment and the extent to which this environment is supportive to addressing the 
challenges these cooperatives face. Two challenges are central to most cooperatives and POs in 
developing countries: product quality control and financial health of the organisation. Mil k quality is 
important as it affects the efficiency of processing and marketing as the quality requirements in consumer 
markets are going up. For milk quality to be enhanced to and maintained at the required level, quality 
assurance systems need to be in place. 
Organizational efficiency is important because cooperatives operate in a competitive market and because 
it is needed for the sustainability of the organisation. Organisational efficiency requires a good balance 
between paying rewarding milk prices to members and retaining a part of earnings in the cooperative for 
having sufficient working capital and even for making investments. Payment systems in cooperatives are 
often problematic, for at least three reasons. First, there is often a perceived lack of  transparency of price 
determination between farmer and cooperative and between cooperative and processor. Second, 
cooperatives often use delayed payment procedures, while private traders (hawkers, peddlers) pay 
immediate cash. Finally, the presence of informal milk collection circuits influences the leeway for 
cooperatives to be strict on member compliance to agreements on product quality and quantity.  
These challenges are analysed in a sample of four dairy cooperatives in Morocco. Three of these co -
operatives were active in milk collection, as they gather daily milk from smallholder farms and sell it to 
dairy processors. The fourth one was large scale milk processing co-operative. We discuss the solutions to 
the organisational challenges in collective marketing as implemented by the dairy cooperatives, and then 
explore how the institutional environment has affected the development and implementation of these 
solutions. The field research is used to ‘ground’ our analysis of the institutional environment in t he real-
world practices of the selected dairy cooperatives in Morocco. The study links to a wider research on the 
interaction between organizational challenges in collective marketing and the institutional environment in 
which these cooperatives operate (Bijman et al., 2012). 
Institutional context and main features of the dairy sector in Morocco 
The dairy chain in Morocco is one of the main animal production chains of the country (Sraïri,  2015). The 
dairy sector in Morocco generates annually close to 1.4 billion USD. More than 300,000 full-time 
producers and around 100,000 seasonal producers make a living out of dairying. The dairy chain in 
Morocco is characterized by a duality. On the one hand, there is the large private processing company 
Centrale Danone whose capital is for 96% controlled by the global food company Danone. On the other 
hand, there are smaller private (e.g. Safilait) and cooperative processors such as COPAG 
(Coopérative Agricole d’Agrumes) (see Figure 1). Centrale Danone is the leading dairy company in 
Morocco, processing 30% of the total raw milk production. 
Around 65% of milk production in Morocco goes through the formal sector whereas 13% goes through 
informal channels. The remaining 22% are used on-farm for self-consumption (Sraïri, 2011). Milk 
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deliveries to dairy collection cooperatives are crucial for the supply of milk to large urban centres, given 
that imports are less than 15% of the total amount of milk consumed (Sraïri et al., 2013). 
The current structure of the Moroccan dairy industry is the result of a historical process consisting of 
roughly five phases. The analysis of this process helps to understand the evolution of the institutional 
environment and the influence of this environment on dairy cooperatives  dealing with organizational 
challenges. 
At the Independence in 1956, the dairy value chain was disorganized and dairy farmers were small and 
dispersed. Distribution circuits were short at the time as the dairy industry was still embryonic and cities 
were mainly supplied directly from neighbouring farms. 
 
ON-FARM 
CONSUMPTION
(22%)
INFORMAL MILK 
PEDDLERS
(13%)
DAIRY COLLECTION CENTRES
(65%)
PRIVATE PROCESSORS
Centrale Danone (30%)
Safilait (3%)
Nestlé (3%)
Others
DOMESTIC RAW MILK PRODUCTION
COOPERATIVE 
PROCESSING UNITS
Copag (11%)
Colainord (3%)
Best Milk (2%)
Others
DAIRY IMPORTS
CONSUMERS
INFORMAL MILK 
PROCESSORS 
(Mahlabates)
 
 
Figure 1.Structure of the dairy chain in Morocco (Based on Sraïri et al., 2013) 
 
The 1970s marked a turning point with the adoption of a national dairy policy, focusing on the most 
favourable areas to develop large-scale irrigation schemes. The Ministry of Agriculture launched a strategy 
called the ‘National Dairy Plan’ aimed at strengthening the Moroccan dairy value chain from production to 
processing and consumption. This strategy was backed by heavy taxes on imported milk powder and 
support to farm gate milk prices. This policy has led to a duality between production and consumption 
areas. Production is located near the mountain areas (and dams) of the central and eastern parts of the 
country while consumption is in the large urban centres along the Atlantic coast. This geographical 
separation causes relatively high transportation costs in the distribution of dairy products.  
The third phase started with the 1983 Structural Adjustment Programmes. The lib eralization of the 
economy resulted in the withdrawal of public policies, exemplified by significant budget cuts. Prices of 
feed concentrates in livestock farming soared. By mid-1980s, state-owned dairy farms were dismantled. 
On the positive side, smallholders adopted the idea of diversifying their sources of income by rearing 
cattle of imported origin while increasing production of milk. The progressive disengagement of the state 
from the dairy sector in the 1980s has resulted in the emergence of private o perators, both in farming and 
in milk processing. In this period, public authorities encouraged the creation of professional associations. 
In 1988, the National Cattle Breeders’ Association (Association Nationale d’Eleveurs Bovins - ANEB) was 
officially created. ANEB took over some of the former public services, like extension services, artificial 
insemination and record keeping. 
In 1992, the liberalization of milk prices throughout the value chain marked the fourth phase in the 
evolution of the dairy sector. This induced a process in which farm-gate milk prices stagnated while 
consumer prices steadily increased (Table 1). This created room for the emergence of informal milk 
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collection circuits to supply neighbouring cities, particularly in the North Western  part of the country. In 
cities like Casablanca, Rabat and Kenitra raw milk started to be sold in small shops locally known as 
Mahlabates. Overall, the sector kept on growing steadily to meet an increasing domestic demand.  
Table 1.  
Milk prices in Morocco, 1995-2015 
Year Farm gate price 
(DH/litre) 
Farm gate price 
(USD/litre) 
Consumer milk 
price (DH/litre) 
Consumer milk 
price (USD/litre) 
Share of farm gate price in 
final consumer milk price (%) 
1995 2.94 0.33 5.00 0.55 58.8 
2000 2.94 0.33 5.40 0.60 54.4 
2005 2.94 0.33 6.20 0.69 47.4 
2010 3.00 0.33 6.40 0.71 46.9 
2015 3.40 0.37 7.00 0.77 48.6 
Source: Sraïri (2015) 
 
The fifth phase started in 2008 when the government re-articulated the dairy chain and renewed its 
commitment to the prioritization of the agricultural sector through the adoption of the “Green Morocco 
Plan”. This plan truly represents a roadmap for the development of Moroccan agriculture towards 2020 
and places the development of value chains at the core of state policies. Support to the secto r is foreseen 
to continue as the government aims at reaching the target of 4.5 million tons of raw milk production by 
2020. Milk prices have increased in 2013 as the government decided a 5% increase of farm -gate prices 
(from 0.33 USD to 0.35 USD per litre) following a 9% increase of consumer milk price fixed by the leading 
dairy company, Centrale Danone. In May 2014, the latter has inflicted on consumers a 10% increase in 
prices of yoghurt and cottage cheese. 
2 Conceptual framework 
This research deals with the interaction between the institutional environment and the organisational 
challenges dairy cooperatives in Morocco face. The institutional context consists of markets, 
infrastructures, institutions per se, networks and trust (Leana and Van Buren, 1999; Ostrom and Ahn, 
2008). We argue that the impact of the institutional environment on solving the organisational challenges 
works through the organisational capacities of the cooperatives. More specifically, our paper focuses on 
organizational capacities for managing collective marketing activities (Ton, 2010). These organisational 
capacities can be enabled or constrained by the external environment. Figure 2 shows that a dairy 
cooperative operates in an institutional context and that this environment affects  certain outcomes 
through the type and strength of organisational capacities. As to the main contextual factors, our paper 
focuses on institutions like political regulation, economic incentives and policy dialogue facilitation, as 
these institutions are expected to affect the ability of the cooperatives to enhance milk quality and 
maintain organisational efficiency. 
Organizational capacities result from social capital that is created when individuals “spend time and 
energy working with other individuals to find better ways of making possible the achievement of certain 
ends that in its absence would not be possible” (Ostrom, 1995). Producer organizations and agricultural 
cooperatives are organisational expressions of this social capital. These organizations c onstantly adapt to 
the institutional environment in order to suit their needs (Herbel and Ourabah Haddad, 2012).  
The main research question addressed in this paper is “What is the influence of the external environment 
on the ways in which dairy cooperatives deal with two organisational challenges?” More specifically, how 
do these cooperatives develop and apply (1) effective and efficient milk quality assurance systems and (2) 
payment systems that can accommodate the financial needs of both smallholder membe rs and the 
cooperative organization? 
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Figure 2. Conceptual framework: institutional environment, organisational capacities and performance outcomes 
(Based on Ton, 2015) 
 
· Developing and applying effective and efficient quality assurance systems 
Delivering quality milk is of crucial importance for a cooperative as it is tightly linked to the quality of the 
processed dairy products, as well as to food and nutrition safety. Failure to meet milk quality 
requirements often becomes a public health issue. A dairy cooperative needs to monitor the quality of the 
raw milk that is delivered to the plant. Low-quality milk cannot be used for Ultra High Temperature milk. 
For cheese or yoghurt making, the milk needs to be free of antibiotics. Low and variable quality pos es a 
risk for the cooperative in its marketing activities. Improperly processed milk may imply a food safety risk 
for consumers, as pathogenic bacteria from the cow may be transmitted to the consumer. Also, foreign 
substances added to the milk may hold a risk for the consumer, as shown by the melamine scandal in 
China.  
Milk quality is one of the main issues where the individual dairy farmer may have a different interest than 
the group. The farmer wants to deliver all his milk, irrespective of the quality, while the cooperative only 
wants to receive milk that complies with minimum quality standards. This inherent tension between 
group and member is called an agency problem. Agency theory addresses information asymmetry and 
incentive incompatibility between trading parties (Eisenhardt, 1989). It applies where one party has an 
informational advantage over another that can be exploited to the benefit of the advantaged party at the 
expense of his trading partner, whenever this information asymmetry is costly to correct (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). To solve the agency problem and prevent opportunistic behaviour of supplying members, 
the cooperative may implement internal rules and regulations for information disclosure through quality 
testing as well as for paying premiums for high quality and applying discounts for low quality deliveries 
(Mujawamariya et al., 2013). 
· Developing and applying payment modalities which can accommodate the financial needs of both 
smallholder members and the cooperative organization 
 
An agricultural cooperative needs to pay for the milk purchased from its member suppliers. Many 
smallholder farmers tend to face cash constraints and expect quick payment, while the cooperative needs 
time to complete transactions with the processing customer. The cooperative needs to secure working 
capital in order to resolve this tension. But this working capital has a price. Delayed payment is inevitable 
when the group cannot access bank loans. However, the cooperative faces competition from o ther buyers 
that may pay immediate cash. Another problem appears when the cooperative provides inputs (e.g., feed) 
and services (e.g., veterinary) to members, to be discounted from the milk payment. Farmers may be 
inclined to side-sell and get a higher price from buyers that did not provide these services.  
The precise internal rules and regulations about milk payment and input provisioning to the members will 
vary according to the needs of the producers, the trust between the cooperative and its members as well 
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as the presence of competing buyers. The payment modalities applied by the dairy cooperatives vary 
according to market dynamics, farmer advocacy, banking technology, legal provisions and regulations and 
any other type of institutional features. 
3 Data and Methods 
We used a case study approach to answer our research question. Four case studies of dairy cooperatives 
in Morocco have been carried out, in the 2015/2016, through 13 in-depth semi-structured interviews with 
three key actors in the cooperative: managing director, elected president and treasurer. A semi-structured 
interview guide with key questions was used. All the interviews were realized face-to-face, at the location 
of the cooperative headquarters. All interviews were conducted in groups, thus with the manager, 
president and treasurer at the same time. After each interview, transcripts were made and a synthesis 
was drawn on the basis of these transcripts. Data was processed in a separate Excel sheet for each 
interviewed cooperative. Data analysis was carried through the use of simple descriptive methods (i.e. 
mean, standard deviation) for quantitative data. 
The sample includes both collection and processing cooperatives, thus covering a diversity of 
organizational forms, which may be differently affected by the institutional environment. The sample is 
made of three milk collection cooperatives and one processing cooperative. Two of the collection 
cooperatives are located in large-scale irrigation schemes: the Al Badre cooperative in the Tadla area 
(Center Eastern part of Morocco) and the Al Fouarate cooperative in the vicinity of Kenitra city, in the 
Gharb large scale irrigation area (North Western part of Morocco). The third milk collection co -operative, 
named Al Mouna, is located in the rain-fed agricultural area of Khémisset, in the Center Western part of 
the country. The fourth cooperative named Colait/Extralait is a dairy processor. It is located in the Gharb 
irrigation area, and it was established in 1953, during the French colonization era,  in order to add value to 
the milk output of the region and to contribute to the supply of dairy products to growing neighbouring 
cities. The main characteristics of these four dairy cooperatives are reported in Table  2. 
In addition, two professional organizations related to the dairy chain in Morocco have been interviewed. 
The two apex professional organizations representing the dairy value chain are the National Cattle 
Breeders Association ANEB and the official dairy chain governing body called FIMALAIT - Fédération 
Interprofessionnelle MArocaine du LAIT - which includes representatives from dairy farmers, milk 
collectors and milk processors. 
Table 2. 
Main characteristics of the four case study cooperatives(2015/2016 data) 
 Al Badre Al Fouarate Al Mouna Colait/Extralait 
Location Tadla irrigation scheme Gharb irrigation 
scheme 
Khemisset rain-
fed area 
Gharb irrigation 
scheme 
Date of creation 2003 1978 2000 1953 
Initial number of members 71 27 12 21 
Current number of members 81 56 9 88 
Daily milk volumes collected 
(metric tons) 
2.5 1.6 3.7 165 
Non-member supply None 35% 20% Second tier 
Source: Interviews done by the authors 
Nora Ourabah Haddad et al./ Int. J. Food System Dynamics 8 (3), 2017, 236-249 
242 
4 Results on initiatives of cooperatives 
In the following, we will discuss the challenges that were experienced by the four case st udy cooperatives 
as well as the solutions that these cooperatives have developed and implemented. The next chapter will 
present the results as to how the institutional environment has supported (or not) the cooperatives in 
dealing with the organisational challenges. 
Challenge 1 – Developing and applying effective and efficient quality control systems 
The quality of raw milk is low in Morocco. This situation is mainly due to the relatively poor hygienic 
quality of milk (i.e. its level of contamination by microorganisms). In addition, milk quality may be low due 
to residues of antibiotics in the milk, which has consequences both as losses of unsold quantities of milk 
and also as a risk to food safety.  
All the stakeholders in the dairy chain acknowledge that on-farm investments and better handling 
practices are needed to improve milk quality. Nevertheless, the price (premium) for quality that is paid by 
the processor is not translated in quality-differentiated prices at farm-level. Payments to farmers are 
based on volumes delivered rather than on the quality of milk. This implies that farmers lack incentives to 
enhance milk quality (Sraïri et al., 2009a). This lack of price incentives for milk quality is difficult to 
address given that the offer of raw milk from smallholder farmers is fragmented. Small volumes of milk 
are delivered by smallholders daily to 2550 small collection cooperatives throughout the country, before 
supplying the processing units. Dairy farmers can switch easily between buyers, and are free to sell to 
informal traders or other cooperatives that collect milk in the area when these pay a better price or apply 
lower quality standards. Especially in the dairy basins located close to the large cities, there are multiple 
private traders who collect milk from the farms and deliver it to the cooperatives. These traders mix the 
milk collected from several farms, making it difficult to avoid contamination and to trace the origin in case 
of a quality problem. 
In general, farmers are perceived as not sufficiently aware of the consequences of antibiotic residues in 
raw milk destined for processing. According to the interviews at Al Badre, for most farmers, the notion of 
milk quality remains insufficiently understood due to the numerous parameters it carries  (hygienic, 
chemical and physical). They feel a lack of clarity on the criteria used to measure the level of quality. 
Moreover, the premium paid by the processor to the cooperative for milk quality deliveries does not 
reach individual farmers despite their efforts to comply with these requirements. 
Solution 1: Initiatives to improve quality at farm level 
As one of the easiest organisational solutions, the cooperative Al  Fouarate started to separate the milk 
delivered by peddlers from the batches coming from private farms. The Al Mouna collection cooperative 
has increased the frequency of milk collection. However, these measures alone are not considered 
sufficient to guarantee required milk quality. Therefore, the Al  Fouarate cooperative has asked its 
members to use exclusively aluminium cans to transport the milk from the farm to the collection centre, 
in order to meet the quality requirements of the processor (i.e. Centrale Danone). However, this measure 
did not hold a consensus among all farmers because of its high cost and the heavy weight of the cans. 
Solution 2: Initiatives to improve quality at the collection centre 
In order to deliver quality milk, many of the sample cooperatives proceed with washing milk tanks with 
disinfection products. Al Badre cooperative for instance bought a high-pressure cleaner to clean the tank. 
The Al Mouna cooperative uses a product called “Easy  Foam VF 32” provided by its client, the dairy 
company Safilait.  
The Al Mouna established a system of mandatory milk collection twice a day with frequent measurements 
of raw milk density and a daily testing of antibiotics residues. This system enables the cooperative to meet 
the dairy plant’s quality requirements. However, even when the collection cooperative puts in place these 
more sophisticated systems of testing antibiotics’ residue, acidity and density, as in the case of Al Mouna 
and Al Fouarate, the testing is not carried out systematically. In practice, tests were only applied on 
samples from those farms for which cooperative managers have a suspicion of treated cows or fraudulent 
behaviour. 
Sometimes, cooperatives prefer paying for contaminated milk, under the condition that it is not delivered 
to the cooperative. As cooperatives do not test the quality of the milk before combinin g it with milk from 
other farmers and delivering it to a processor, contaminated milk may jeopardize the supply relationship 
with the processing customer, as the processor may reject those deliveries. Since 2013, the cooperative 
Al Badre has adopted a policy of paying for non-delivery of the milk containing antibiotics residues.  
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FIMALAIT is currently preparing a program in collaboration with the National Office of Sanitary Security of 
Food Products (Office National de la Sécurité Sanitaire des produitsAlimentaires - ONSSA) to strengthen 
the capacities of the staff operating in milk collection centres. Some 340 collection centres out of 2550 
have been identified as needing specific support to make sure that they comply with international 
standards. Water quality is considered as an important issue in order to facilitate cleaning of the cooling 
tanks in the centres, and equipment is needed for milk quality analysis.  
Solution 3: Transparency in quality testing 
In several cooperatives, including Al Badre, both the top management and the members complain about 
the lack of transparency of the evaluation system for milk quality. In fact, the criteria used to evaluate 
milk quality are imposed by the dairy processor, who is the only operator with laboratory analysis d evices, 
and therefore the cooperative members have no say in the definition of criteria and no way as to dispute 
the test results. In fact, dairy processors use the issue of milk contamination by antibiotics to avoid 
collecting all the raw milk supplied by farmers. Since a single batch from a farm that treated a sick cow 
with antibiotics can contaminate the entire milk tank in a collection cooperative, dairy processing 
factories use this argument to reject raw milk, and this allows them to avoid paying farm ers. Such 
behaviour is particularly used in cases of excess milk supply, with the result that collection cooperatives’ 
members have to find alternative solutions to sell milk, such as informal milk markets in suburban areas, 
but at lower prices. 
The cooperatives Al Mouna and Al Fouarate had good but short-lived experiences to control the 
processors’ laboratory results. For example, in 2012, the dairy processor sold to the cooperative Al 
Fouarate a rather costly (1500 USD) miniature laboratory called Milkoscan, which performed rapid routine 
tests on raw milk chemical quality. This milk quality assessment system has resulted in improvements in 
milk traceability, allowing a rapid identification of batches with limited fat contents or inadequate solids 
non-fat contents. It also allowed a stabilisation of raw milk prices paid to the cooperative, as the members 
of the cooperative had a reliable tool to challenge the results of the tests that were carried out by the 
processor.  
However, this system came to an end when the device broke down for lack of maintenance. The 
cooperative could not afford to get a new device as advised by Centrale Danone. For the same objective of 
increased traceability, the cooperative Al Fouarate purchased a Gerber centrifugation machine that 
determines milk fat content according to the standard method used for this analysis.  
Given the complex handling of chemicals such as sulphuric acid, as well as its time -consuming routines 
(more than 30 minutes for a single analysis), this device is no longer used by the cooperative. 
FIMALAIT is also planning to create laboratories dedicated to milk quality analysis. This requires good 
governance and good collaboration within the dairy chain. Currently, there is a willingness to develop 
three laboratories located in the most prominent regions of dairy farming in Morocco, namely Doukkala, 
the Gharb and the Tadla regions, which currently represent 60% of the national raw milk output. These 
regions are expected to become more prominent as they have relatively abundant water availability 
allowing a sustainable development of the dairy activity in comparison to water scarce areas.  
Challenge 2 - Developing and applying payment systems that can accommodate the financial needs of 
both members and cooperative organization 
Private traders deliver the raw milk directly to private factories through private collection centres. This 
situation creates fierce competition between cooperatives and private traders. This results in a dairy 
sector in Morocco characterized by a segmented supply given the large number of small and family 
producers, which deliver small quantities of milk. This makes it difficult to introduce payment systems at 
farm-gate that reflect quality-based prices for milk (Sraïri and Chohin-Kuper, 2007).  
In the three collection cooperatives Al Mouna, Al Badre and Al Fouarate, farmers are paid for the delivery 
of the raw milk every second week. Therefore, these cooperatives find themselves in a delicate financial 
situation with liquidity imbalances as they have to pay their farmer suppliers while not having received 
payment from their processing customers. To solve this problem, some cooperatives negotiate with their 
bank to obtain financial facilities such as overdraft authorization. As these financial facili ties are costly, 
the cooperative is confronted with weak business margins. This situation reaches its paroxysm during low 
production periods when overhead (salaries, payment of electricity bills, transport, and procurement of 
material) exceeds income from milk sales. “Business is highly seasonal” as it was expressed by 
interviewees from the Al Mouna and Al Fouarate cooperatives. Both suffer from this seasonality, as they 
are located in areas where irrigation facilities are limited, implying periods of sever e fodder shortages and 
reduced raw milk output. 
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Solution 1: Shortening the payment period 
The private companies have to pay taxes as opposed to cooperatives that are exempted from such 
payment. Milk prices of private traders are lower than those from the cooperatives. Nevertheless, milk 
volumes collected by the cooperative Al Fouarate have been decreasing as farmers started to increasingly 
sell to private traders. Also, private traders are not as demanding as cooperatives with regard to the 
quality of raw milk and farmers do not have to transport the raw milk as it is collected at the farm gate by 
a fleet of pick-up trucks 
Different payment systems are being put in place by collection cooperatives to reduce the delayed 
payment period for farmers. For instance, the cooperative Al Badre ensures rapid payment of its farmers 
on a regular basis at the end of a week period. The cooperative has also developed the capacity of paying 
farmers through a bank transfer. However, this modern payment system is not accepted by all farmer 
members as the majority (80% in the case of Al Badre and Al Mouna) still prefer receiving cash. 
Solution 2: Provision of additional social services 
Some cooperatives have been developing social services to their members. Al Badre for instance  has 
managed to implement several financial activities with social implications benefitting the whole village 
community, beyond member farmers. In 2008, it bought an ambulance to transport villagers in need of 
getting urgent medical care. Besides, the cooperative has built a school and a room for medical assistance. 
The cooperative finances also a medical insurance plan worth 60 USD per year for its members by 
contracting with a private insurance company. This social insurance plan came unfortunately to an end 
soon after the private company’s decision to increase the insurance premium significantly to  180 USD per 
year. 
Solution 3: Value addition to increase farmers’ incomes  
Value addition represents an avenue for farmers to increase their income. For exampl e, farmers from the 
Al Badre cooperative prompted a movement to transform raw milk into value added dairy products such 
as mozzarella cheese. However, this initiative remained at the individual level instead of being 
internalized as a service by the cooperative, since the management of the cooperative has not been able 
to find a reliable client who would buy daily the output of cheese all year long. Contacts are still being 
established with restaurants located in the city of Casablanca to try to sell the da ily output of mozzarella 
at good prices. 
Solution 4: Establishment of contract farming  
Despite unbalanced relationships between cooperatives and private processing firms such as Centrale 
Danone, overall the cooperatives recognize that contracts with the private processors allow them to get a 
steady income, even in times of excess milk supply. They do not get this type of stability when dealing 
with other processors. 
5 Results on the institutional environment 
A summary of the challenges faced by the dairy cooperatives in Morocco and the measures adopted to 
overcome them is reported in Table 3. In view of the two main organizational challenges that hinder the 
marketing capacity of the cooperative, as well as the solutions that they found to address them, we n ow 
present the key findings on the role of the institutional environment.  
· Coordination in the dairy chain 
Farmers cannot be paid on the basis of quality parameters, fat and protein content and level of microbial 
contamination because milk from different farmers is put together at the cooperative collection centre 
before it is delivered to the processor (in this case Safilait and Centrale Danone) and no individual quality 
check takes place. At the level of the processor, the quality of the whole batch is mea sured, and the 
cooperative is paid according to the quality level of the whole batch. Payments of the cooperative to the 
individual farmers are based on volumes only (Sraïri et al., 2009a). For example, the Colait/Extralait dairy 
processing cooperative, located in the suburbs of the Kenitra city, is mainly supplied through its 91 
collection centres. These centres may, however, be tempted to deliver to other processors (e.g., Centrale 
Danone or COPAG) when Colait/Extralait will apply strict quality controls on the milk delivered by farmers. 
The Colait/Extralait cooperative continues to suffer from unfair competition from milk traders working 
mainly in informal milk trading networks given the proximity to several important urban centres including 
the conurbation of Kenitra-Salé-Rabat (population of 3 million). This situation creates unfair competition 
to formal milk collection circuits. However, the informal circuits seem to accommodate both farmers and 
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consumers, i.e. farmers selling directly to small shops without having to comply with complicated 
procedures of quality and payment, and consumers pay lower prices for fresh milk and traditional dairy 
preparations (e.g., buttermilk, locally known as lben, and yogurts locally known as raib), available in small 
milk shops called Mahlabates. Importantly, these circuits are tolerated by local authorities because of the 
important social and economic roles they play. In fact, they provide steady incomes for a large number of 
families (Sraïri et al., 2007). 
 
Table 3. 
The main challenges and solutions regarding marketing capacity of dairy cooperatives in Morocco 
 
Main organizational 
challenges 
Main issues Main initiatives 
 
 
 
Effective and 
efficient quality 
control systems 
Low milk quality for 
processing 
 
Food safety risk for 
consumers 
 
Lack of understanding of the 
concept of milk quality by 
dairy farmers 
 
Segmented milk collection 
networks which prevent 
quality-defined milk pricing 
 
Initiatives to improve quality at farm level: 
- Capacity development and infrastructure development 
- Sanctioning fraudulent behaviour as part of rules and 
procedures 
- Using aluminium cans to transport milk to the cooperative 
collection centre 
- Increasing frequency of milk collection 
 
Initiatives to improve quality and traceability  at collection centre: 
- Separation of trader-provided milk 
- Payment of contaminated milk from the cooperative to farmers 
as an incentive not to deliver it to the client processor.  
- Improvements in cleaning of cooling tanks 
- Regular testing of raw milk density 
- Investments in quality control devices 
- Agribusiness providing cooperatives with devices for quality 
testing 
 
Initiatives to improve transparency in quality testing: 
- Fair use of quality tests by processing plant 
- Investments to control tests results 
- Accredited laboratories 
 
 
 
Payment systems to 
accommodate 
financial needs of 
member 
cooperatives and 
cooperative 
organizations 
Need for transparency of 
price setting (premiums & 
penalties) from farmer to 
cooperative and cooperative 
to processor 
 
- Delayed payment by 
cooperatives to farmers 
versus cash payment by 
traders 
 
- Informal milk collection 
circuits create unfair price 
competition for 
cooperatives 
 
Shortening the payment period: 
- Rapid payment system in cash or bank transfer according to milk 
volumes delivered 
- Increase bankability of farmers 
 
Provision of additional services: 
- Provide transport to collect the milk on the farm 
- Financing social protection services 
- Developing product value addition 
 
Establishing contract farming: 
- Long-term agreements between collection centres and agri-
business processor ensuring steady farm incomes and a way to 
provide embedded services (e.g. credit facilities) 
 
· Financial instruments and capacity development programs that facilitate investments in quality assurance 
equipment 
Despite some efforts of collection cooperatives to upgrade milk quality and meet the requirements of 
private processors, in most of the cases the measures to be implemented are too costly (aluminium cans, 
quality testing devices) or unsustainable (devices not easy to maintain,  unfair competition of informal 
circuits). The cooperatives’ leeway to improve the quality of milk deliveries is therefore limited.  
In most of the cases, the lack of financial resources needed for investments in quality control equipment 
and the lack of capacity development programs on quality management are serious impediments for 
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cooperatives to pay farmers for the quality of their individual deliveries and to supply the processors with 
consistent quality milk. These cooperatives are in need of support for investments, for capacity building 
programmes, and for the implementation of innovative payment systems. If Morocco is to expect 
significant increases in milk yield per cow on the numerous smallholder farms, higher levels of 
government support are needed (Sraïri et al., 2011). At the same time, the room for improving milk 
quality with fair remuneration of smallholder farmers in a context of fragmented supply is limited. The 
presence of competitors from the informal sector and the lack of transparency in q uality measurement by 
private processors are other reasons for the limited room of manoeuvre of the cooperatives.  
· Institutional support for effective smallholder collective action 
The study revealed a perception of a lack of support from the institutional environment and notably of the 
current state policies for smallholders and their cooperatives. According to our respondents, the Green 
Morocco Plan includes measures for supporting collective action, but they do not reach smallholder 
cooperatives. The ANEB and Al Fouarate representatives pointed out that support measures to 
smallholder farmer organizations allocated by the Green Morocco Plan through FIMALAIT were not 
implemented. An annual envelope of 15 million DH (eq. 1.5 Million USD) has now been allocat ed to the 
dairy chain through FIMALAIT after five years of delay in disbursement. Another 55 Million DH 
(eq. 5.5 million USD) per year should have been made available to the dairy chain operators and in 
particular to farmers. FIMALAIT is planning to convene a meeting with board members to decide on the 
use of the 15 million DH per year. This situation is a result of the lack of trust among the dairy chain 
actors, within the inter-profession FIMALAIT and also towards cooperative managers. Mistrust is partly 
due to the unclear governance structure within FIMALAIT and the weight of farmers’ representatives 
compared to processors’ representatives, asymmetric information in the market, but most importantly 
unbalanced power relations between chain actors.  
· Connections between cooperatives, private companies and public authorities 
The establishment of the Green Morocco Plan in 2008 prompted the need for each commodity chain to 
create its own representative body. As a result, FIMALAIT, the Moroccan Inter-professional Dairy 
Federation was created in 2009. This inter-professional body brings together representatives of dairy 
farmers, milk collection cooperatives and milk processors.  
During its creation, the inter-professional organization gave rise to a number of trust related issues among 
actors due to a lack of clear governance mechanisms within the organization. For example, according to 
ANEB, some processors have not accepted the idea of discussing sensitive issues with regard to the dairy 
chain. Also, Centrale Danone has insisted on having its own group of farmer suppliers (namely the 
Fédération Nationale des Producteurs Laitiers - FNPL) to be represented in FIMALAIT instead of ANEB as 
the overall representative of livestock farmers at the national level. After an in tervention by state 
authorities, ANEB and FNPL merged into FENEPROL (Fédération Nationale des Eleveurs Producteurs 
Laitiers), which is meant to constitute the unique representing body of dairy farmers at the national level. 
On the milk processing side, private companies as well as cooperatives formed the Fédération Nationale 
des Industriels Laitiers (FNIL) and this entity is also represented in FIMALAIT. 
FENEPROL and FNIL have reorganised FIMALAIT and according to an official decree FIMALAIT is now the 
only legitimate body to represent the dairy chain. It has therefore become eligible for public funds and 
public programs destined to the development of the dairy chain. The first meeting of FIMALAIT also 
included representatives from the Ministry of Agriculture. The director of Centrale Danone was elected as 
the first president of FIMALAIT, with the support of the Ministry of Agriculture, despite ANEB’s initial 
reservations. After convening a crisis meeting in 2013, in a context marked by soaring milk powder pr ices 
on international markets, FIMALAIT requested national authorities to intervene through an increase in 
milk prices throughout the dairy chain (from farm gate to consumer). In August 2013, national authorities 
responded favourably to the request with price increases shared between processors and farmers. 
The dairy sector has recently suffered from bad publicity related to the quality of dairy products and the 
assumption that milk consumption has a negative effect on human health. Unfortunately, this issu e 
exacerbated in 2015, at a time where favourable climate conditions (heavy and steady rainfall throughout 
fall 2014 and winter until spring 2015) induced a significant increase in raw milk output. In view of 
rebuilding the reputation of the sector and solving the issue of reduced dairy product sales, the inter-
professional organization FIMALAIT launched a large campaign that included scientific conferences and TV 
spots, aimed at promoting consumption of dairy products.  
The main challenge for FIMALAIT is to find board members capable of advocating the joint interests of all 
the actors of the dairy chain. FIMALAIT has recently (November 2016) obtained the final approval from 
public authorities to be recognized as the only representative body of the dairy chai n in Morocco. Another 
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challenge of this body which is expected to play a major role both at national as well as at regional level is 
to find a budget and the competences that will allow expansion of its activities.  
6 Discussion and Conclusion 
In the ambition to be effective marketing organisations for their members, cooperatives face several 
organisational challenges. One of these challenges relates to the development and application of a quality 
control system (Kirezieva et al., 2016). Good quality milk is important for processors as it enhances the 
efficiency of processing, but it is also important for consumers as it often relates to food safety (Luning et 
al., 2015).The cause of this organisational challenge is the classical collective action problem: th e 
individual member has an interest in reducing effort (and thus costs) in reaching a certain product quality 
level, while the cooperative has an interest in receiving products of agreed quality level  as that directly 
relates to efficiency in processing and marketing (Winfree and McCluskey, 2005). Particularly when 
information is asymmetrically distributed (in order words when transparency is lacking) and incentives 
structures are not clear, members of a cooperative do not have an incentive to exert effort or make an 
investment (Cook, 1995). 
Internal regulations on quality standards and measurement may solve the collective action problem. 
However, these regulations do not work effectively in situations where quality cannot easily (i.e., against 
low costs) be measured and in situations where farmers have alternative, more attractive sales options 
(Mujawamariya et al., 2013). The latter implies that members of a cooperative can sell milk to traders (or 
even other cooperatives) that do not apply quality controls while still paying the same price as the 
cooperative. 
In those situations, a cooperative cannot solve the problem of low quality individually. Because test 
equipment is expensive and members have alternative sales options, no majority of members can be 
found to agree on investments in such equipment. One way to address this problem is collaboration 
among cooperatives to setting up joint quality testing facilities and collectively agreeing to use the 
outcomes of the test in rewarding/punishing their members (Sexton, 1984). This, however, does not solve 
the problem of competition by private traders who do not require a particular milk quality level while 
paying the same price. The latter problem can be solved by state regulations on minimum milk quality and 
compulsory quality testing (Chang, 2009). Thus, the state can play an important role in enhancing milk 
quality by setting minimum standards, controlling compliance and sanctioning non -complying actors. 
Another solution requires close collaboration in the dairy chain. Milk processors could pay premiums for 
good quality milk, and help collecting cooperatives to test the milk deliveries (Dries et al., 2009). This 
solution also requires individual payments for milk deliveries, as group deliveries continue to all ow free 
riding behaviour by individual group members. Still, the issue of investing in milk quality testing remains. 
The state could support cooperatives in investing in and building capacity for decentralized quality testing 
at the milk collection points. 
From our exploration of milk collection cooperatives in Morocco it has become clear that developing and 
implementing quality testing systems is typically a task of a partnership between public and private 
actors, where state regulation and financial support has to go hand in hand with strict agreements both 
among cooperatives (thus in the horizontal space) and between cooperatives and private milk processors 
(thus in the vertical dairy chain). 
Our study has shown that dairy cooperatives in Morocco have high expectations of the supporting role of 
the state. This not only relates to basic public services like good infrastructure, agricultural research, and 
a judicial system that facilitates contract enforcement, but also to implementing regulations on minimum  
milk quality, facilitating quality testing, and monitoring compliance to those rules. In other words, dairy 
cooperatives demand an enabling institutional environment in which the state plays an important 
coordinating and standard-setting role. 
State policies may also facilitate the dialogue between the various actors of the value chain, particularly 
within FIMALAIT. By facilitating a space for professional organizations and agricultural cooperatives to 
establish dialogue platforms allowing them to discuss policies, the government is supporting the 
development of social capital as a precondition for the legitimacy of these platforms to foster 
collaboration and networking. In fact, both quality improvement and the establishment of fair and 
efficient payment schemes may benefit from strong collaboration between public and private actors along 
the dairy chain. This will not only lead to enhanced information exchange but also to solving 
organisational challenges. 
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